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Ill. A COMMENTARY ON THE EXTERNAL LAw PAPERS
MARILYN TEITELBAUM*

I think I have the best of all worlds because I can read these great
papers, without having to prepare one of my own, and like all
lawyers I like to talk. So, I can share my views, that sometimes
diverge from both of the views just presented, particularly the view
from the management perspective.
In one part of Ted St.Antoine's paper that was not discussed with
you today, he says that the external law question may be a "tempest
in a tea pot." My words would be similar-"much ado about
nothing." I think there is a fairly easy way to deal with the problem.
I, as representative of "the union," used to be the one that was
always trying to bring in external law. I still do that, but now I do it
in a different way. I agree that the arbitrator's authority comes from
the contract and I try to make things easier for the arbitrators by not
asking them to decide external law as such. But, ifl want the law to
be considered, I word the issue in a way that I can argue external
law under the contract. For example, if it's an NLRA violation, I
may define the issue as, "Did the employer violate the collective
bargaining agreement by unilaterally changing the terms and
conditions of employment?" Or ifit's a discharge case involving sex
or race discrimination, "Did the employer violate the just cause
clause of the contract by discharging the grievant because of her
sex."
In the 27 years I've been doing arbitrations, and I do a lot of
them, I can't think of any case in which the issue of external law
could not be handled this way. If the contract does not mention
external law, Title VII, the FMLA, or any other civil rights statute,
their basic ideas are already incorporated in every contract that I
manage. These ideas are incorporated in a number of ways. A
discipline or discharge case is normally covered by the just cause
clause. Is there just cause to discharge anyone when to do so is a
violation of Title VII or the ADA or the ADEA? If the FMLA is
involved, "Did the Company violate the FMLA when it... ?" By
handling the issue of external law this way, you do not put the
arbitrator in the position where you are asking him or her to
interpret federal law.

*Schuchat, Cook & Werner, St.Louis, Missouri.
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There's also another provision that I've used to make arbitrators
feel more comfortable. Almost every collective bargaining agreement has a clause that says that if any provision of this contract is
in conflict with or is a violation of federal or state law, it is void. So
to the extent any action of the company, such as a discharge, is in
violation of the ADA or ADEA, it cannot be upheld under this
contract provision even though the company claims that other
provisions allow it. So, the issue of permitting or requiring employees or employers to violate the law does not really arise if you apply
this contract clause.
Let me give you a couple other examples. Let's take the FMLA.
Let's say the union has agreed to a no-fault absentee policy. But if
someone is on an FMLA qualifying leave, the employer cannot
charge the employee points while on that leave. And, if the
company disciplined the person for reasons that included an
FMLA absence, it would violate the just cause provision as well as
the FMLA. So I tell the arbitrators about the FMLA while still asking
them to decide the case under the just cause clause.
On NLRB issues, the most common matters involve either
unilateral change or a discharge or discipline for union activities.
Usually we process the case under the just cause provision or as a
unilaterally (non bargained) change in the contract. Whatever the
case, however, the union is not asking the arbitrator to decide
whether the action violates the NLRA. The only possible NLRA
violation that I am aware of that may not also be a contractual
violation relates to the production of information. If there is
nothing in the contract giving the union the right to information,
it is not very credible to state the issue as a contract violation. There
are some rumblings that the Labor Board may begin deferring
charges relating to information requests to arbitration. We have so
far successfully argued to the Board that it should not defer those
cases, however.
Let's turn to the Americans with Disabilities Act. I used to argue
violations of this Act, e.g., reasonable accommodation, disability,
etc. Now, partially because the ADA has been interpreted by the
courts so restrictively, I use the nondiscrimination clause in the
collective bargaining agreement. My position is that the nondiscrimination clause in the contract, combined with a just cause
clause, is much broader than the ADA. I approach the problem not
by examining the three-pronged definition of disability in the Act
(actually disabled, record of disability, perceived as disabled), but
by asking such questions as, "Is it reasonable for the employer to
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accommodate them in this way? Is their disability interfering with
them doing their regular job? And, is there a reasonable way to
accommodate them?" In an Ameren case that I had, the employer
brought in ADA case law and argued that there was no violation of
the ADA. The company was actually thereby asking the arbitrator
to decide the case under external law. I argued that the dispute was
not one of external law, it was not the ADA, rather, it was the
nondiscrimination clause in the agreement, and that clause was
not tied to the ADA. My argument won that case.
Furthermore, our position since the Supreme Court's decision
in Wright1 is to advise our union clients not to identify specific
statutes in their nondiscrimination clause, but simply to say that the
parties will not discriminate because of race, sex, etc. We do this
because we don't want to make a federal case out of arbitration,
and we do not want to prejudice the employee's court case if the
arbitrator does not find for him or her. I want the employee to have
another bite of the apple because a court case is not an arbitration.
Ifl have a choice, I want to try my employment discrimination case
before a jury. Ifl have a decent case based on just cause, I go for that
just cause case. If there is some evidence of discrimination, I throw
it in. If there's a lot of evidence, I certainly put that in, but I know
as a practical matter that if the arbitrator thinks that there is serious
discrimination, he or she will reinstate the employee.
I do not think that the "intent" of the nondiscrimination clause
is ever going to have a great impact on the arbitration process for
two reasons. First, these nondiscrimination clauses go back 30, 40
years and we are not going to find anybody alive, well enough,
interested, and knowledgeable enough to testify to the original
intent. Second, the just cause provision and the conflicts clause are
going to apply to all discrimination issues regardless of the original
intent of the nondiscrimination clause.
With respect to Ted's concern about the seniority case that was
reversed on appeal, remember, contracts are renewed every two or
three years. If the law changes you can file another grievance or the
company can contend that the provision doesn't apply because the
law changed. I don't have much concern about the law changing
and I don't think you should either because you interpret the
contract in light of then-current law.

1

Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
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The point I want to end with is Bob's statement concerning class
action relief and that the arbitrator who awarded it would go off his
list. I don't want any of you to be intimidated by that promise
because you will be added to a lot more lists by doing that.

IV.

PANEL DISCUSSION

Theodore J. St. Antoine, Past President and NM
Member, Ann Arbor, Michigan
Management: Robert Vercruysse, Vercruysse Murray & Calzone
Bingham Farms, Michigan
Labor:
Marilyn S. Teitelbaum, Schuchat, Cook &
Werner, St. Louis, Missouri
Moderator:

Vercruysse: There are a few things that need to be discussed in
light of Marilyn's comments. First, parties do write collective
bargaining agreements that are explicit with regard to what the
arbitrators can do with civil rights clauses. What they say is that the
terms and conditions of this contract shall be applied without
regard to race, color, religion, national origin, weight, height,
marital status-whatever they want. If that's what the contract says,
they are not reaching out and bringing Title VII into the collective
bargaining agreement.
Con tracts that I've negotiated since 1972 have all contained that
clause. And where they do not, I try to get that changed because the
union generally does not want to incorporate outside law and put
themselves in a situation where we give to arbitrators, clearly and
distinctly, the authority to decide discrimination issues. So the
parties have the opportunity to give to arbitrators the ability to
decide discrimination cases and keep them out of the courts.
Unions are very careful, as Marilyn indicated, to make it clear that
they're not giving up that second bite of the apple. They want to
ensure that they still have the right to file their Title VII case after
the arbitrator's already decided that the employer did not discriminate against the employee and terminated him or her for just
cause.
Another interesting issue concerns the conflict between seniority rights and the application of Civil Rights statutes. What the
employer is trying to do, for example, is make a more diverse work
force because the employer has a desire for greater degrees of
diversity in the workforce. If seniority consistently controls, as it
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does in many of the plants in the rust belt, it's going to be a long
time before we see any minority group members becoming skilled
tradesmen. So the employer, on the side of trying to do what's
right, is pushing the terms of the seniority provisions of the
contract in order to try to get people in the workforce.
Another difficult area comes when there is conflict between
seniority and the right of the employee to have a better job. An
employee with a disability may want to work and may be able to
work in the tool crib. But tool crib jobs generally go to higher
seniority employees because they are desirable. If you have somebody who is physically disabled and you want to find work for them,
that's often a spot for them, and it's a desirable solution under
external law. The seniority clause, therefore, stops that employer
who wants to try to do the right thing and keep the disabled
employee in the work place, making good money.
Both Marilyn and I understand these conflicts and we know how
to write language that gives arbitrators the signals about what
authority they have. And Marilyn and I also know when to let the
courts decide the issue. I think the combination of Mittenthal, St.
Antoine, and Meltzer is a powerful combination for you to look at
in the historical application of the law and the arbitral law that will
allow you to continue to be upheld by all the courts in the worldthat's look to the agreement of the parties.
St. Antoine: Before I open the floor to questions, I want to make
sure that all of you, especially the non-lawyers, are aware of the two
important Supreme Court cases mentioned by Bob and Marilyn.
One of them, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, was decided under a
collective bargaining agreement in the 1970s. The Supreme Court
concluded that an employee, who lost his case in arbitration, could
take his claim of a Title VII racial discrimination violation to
federal court. The Court essentially reasoned that all the arbitrator
was deciding was the contract claim under the collective bargaining agreement and that left open the statutory claim under Title
VII. To use a phrase that our friend David Feller often used-"it
wasn't a case of two bites at the apple, it was two apples at which you
had one bite each."
In the 1990s the Supreme Court decided the famous Gilmer case
involving a non-union situation in which a stock broker agent had
signed an agreement with his employer that all disputes would be
decided finally by the arbitrator, including statutory claims. When
the employee tried to take an age discrimination directly to court,
the employer argued successfully that he was precluded from going
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to court because he waived the statutory right to do so. The Court
then permitted the arbitrator to decide both the contract claim
and the statutory claim. What Bob is pointing out is that parties can
write their contracts differently and indeed, in the subsequent
Wright case, the Supreme Court held that a union might be able to
waive an individual employee's right to take his or her complaint
to the courts, but to do so, the waiver had to be "clear and
unmistakable." It's my impression that most unions are probably
not going to enter into any such waiver because they are fearful of
the political consequences, e.g., making their black members feel
they are somehow being deprived of rights they otherwise would
have. Or, as Marilyn alluded to, unions believe that employees
should have a chance to get before a judge and jury.
I do wonder whether unions, perhaps with some employers'
help, couldn't be persuaded to give up the right to go to court on
behalf of their constituents or surrender the right of bargaining
unit members to go to court in return for some other employee
benefit. Bob pointed out that it costs something like $150,000 or
more to litigate a civil rights case, and on the coasts it's more than
$200,000. That's a lot of money. Why haven't unions thought more
imaginatively about being prepared to waive the rights of the
employee to go to court clearly and unmistakably and letting the
arbitrator decide it in final and binding fashion as arbitrators do
with most other matters? That would be a nice bargaining chip for
other benefits for the bargaining unit. I do wonder how often it is
an advantage to have that second bite at the second apple. When
Mr. Alexander got to federal court, he lost. The arbitrator's
decision, in effect, was seconded by the Federal District Court. I
would ask both in terms of the conservation of resources and the
greatest good for the greatest number, whether it isn't a mistake to
insist on always allowing employees to have a second bite at the
apple.
Teitelbaum: It's not clear yet to me and I don't think it's clear in
the law that if the unions clearly and unmistakably agreed to waive
those rights, the employee would be precluded from going to
court. Let's say that an arbitrator did find that an employee was
discharged because of race. If the arbitrator does not have authority to award the kind of damages that the employee could obtain
under Title VII, I'm not sure that the waiver would stand up.
I don't want to prejudice the rights of the employees to go to
court for a variety of reasons. First, although we have discovery in
arbitration, we don't have the kind of discovery that the employee
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has when he or she goes into court. And there are other issues.
Arbitration gets the case done faster, but the employee does not
have the same damage potential as a court decision.
I would like to go back to my earlier statement about contract
language and external law. Is there anyone in the audience who
believes if a person was discharged because they were black, that
that would not violate the just cause clause? So that takes care of all
your discharge/ discipline issues. If you found a clause that was in
violation of federal or state law and there's a clause in the contract,
that anything in violation of federal or state law is void-is there
anybody here that wouldn't void out something in violation of
federal law such as a no-fault absentee policy applied to FMIA
qualified leave? You just don't have this problem if the advocates
present it to you correctly. Unfortunately, it looks like a lot of them
present it to you "as whether there is a violation of the NLRB or of
Title VII." That's not the question.
St. Antoine: Let's get the audience involved. Would you please
move up and use the microphone and announce yourselves?
From the Floor: Is there any agency that would facilitate the kind
of negotiations that would lead to some sort of consent on the part
of the parties to have the arbitrator deal with these things
dispositively?
Vercruysse: I serve on the EEO's mediation and arbitration
committee in the Michigan area and one of the things we 're talking
about is trying to get early resolution of discrimination claims by
referring them to mediation and also talking about arbitration as
another way of resolving those claims.
From the Floor: How about language making the arbitrator's
decision final and dispositive? The EEOC will resist that.
Vercruysse: I think we need to work on the EEOC. Marilyn and
I both participate in the ABA EEO committee and I participate in
the NLRB Developing Labor Law Committee. I think all of us have
an obligation to talk about this as a concept that we can work on to
get more inexpensive justice. The only thing that we have to make
sure of is that the quality of justice stays at a high level.
From the Floor: And that there's full relief.
Vercruysse: Yes. That's why I think the due process protocols
that were developed are so important to this concept of allowing
arbitration to take over and have a more important role to play in
th~ resolution of the discrimination aspect of the disputes that
anse.
From the Floor: Do you recommend it to your employers?
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Vercruysse: No. I like the idea of having three judges and then
the opportunity to appeal it to the Supreme Court if somebody
makes a mistake oflaw. I know that this is a topic that's being talked
about all the time.
From the Floor: I want to stir the pot a little more here. I worry
about judicial review in the courts. Take a case where an arbitrator
is empowered by the parties to apply external law and then hands
down an award. The losing party files in court and raises the now
judicially engrafted ground for vacating awards under section 10 of
the FAA, i.e., manifest disregard of the law. I think arbitrators
should be aware of the fact that if you accept that authority to
interpret external law, you may also be allowing the courts to apply
a different and a higher standard ofjudicial review. Of course, the
subquestion is this: If you are going to interpret the law because
you've been empowered to do so, do you interpret the law as
written by the Supreme Court or by the Circuit Court of Appeals in
which you're sitting and hearing the arbitration?
St. Antoine: The famous footnote 21 in Alexander v. GardnerDenvermay apply here. The footnote, which has been followed by
many federal courts, says that if the arbitrator's decision has
followed fair procedures and if the arbitrator knows what he or she
is doing in terms of the law, that award can be admitted to the
federal district court in a subsequent trial and given "great weight."
While it isn't dispositive technically, quite a few courts have taken
advantage of that footnote and have given great weight to the
arbitrator's award on the discrimination claim.
From the Floor: With all due respect, I wrote the only amicus
brief in favor of deferral of arbitration filed with the Supreme
Court in Gardner Denver.
St. Antoine: Maybe you won something in 21.
From the Floor: Footnote 21 may be the result of the brief that
I filed. That still, I think, does not reach the issue of the manifest
disregard standard, which increasingly the circuit courts are beginning to apply and which the Supreme Court has yet to talk about
since Wilko v. Swan. It's an open season.
Teitelbaum: I agree with you. That's just another reason not to
incorporate specifics on the law into the contract. If the arbitrator
tries to apply the ADA, for example, he or she is likely to make
some serious mistakes and get the decision reversed. I agree with
you.
From the Floor: I question whether a union has the authority to
bargain a provision requiring the employee to submit their civil
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rights claim to arbitration. I think that it is discriminatory for a
union to condition an employee's waiver of that right on his or her
right to participate in the grievance procedure.
Teitelbaum: I don't think that there's anyway that we could put
a clause in the contract that says the employee is obligated to do it.
But what we have is a grievance arbitration procedure, in which
employees can bring all the grievances they want to bring under
the contract. The way I read Wright, I don't think that a collective
bargaining agreement is ever going to be held to waive the
individual employee's rights to go to court on Title VII claims.
Vercruysse: Ifwe take a look at what's happened in Gilmer, the
Supreme Court has said very clearly that there you can have
arbitrators decide statutory rights as long as they've been given the
authority to give the remedy. If you do the same thing under a
collective bargaining agreement, and I agree that we shouldn't do
that, arbitrators are probably going to have that authority to decide
statutory issues and the Supreme Court will probably uphold their
decisions because arbitrators just don't get reversed anymore. The
only time you can really get an arbitrator reversed is if you can show
fraud, if you can show that the arbitrator was related to one of the
parties or didn't disclose a prior professional relationship with a
party. In terms of interpreting the law, maybe it makes sense that
if an arbitrator absolutely disregards the law and he's been given
the authority to interpret the law, that his award should be subject
to being overturned because the parties didn't bargain for the
arbitrator ignoring the law.
St. Antoine: Let me get this word in. I think all three of us are in
agreement that the Supreme Court has not squarely decided the
question of whether a union could clearly and unmistakably waive
the right of an individual employee to take a discrimination claim
to court, leaving only the arbitration procedure under the collective bargaining agreement as the sole resort.
From the Floor: I thought the Seventh Circuit came in on those
other issues since then.
St. Antoine: I don't know of any such decision. In any event, it's
clear that it is an issue that the Supreme Court has not resolved. It
is also fair to mention that my fellow panelists have agreed,
somewhat to my surprise, that unions shouldn't do it in any event.
For me that remains an open question. Remember, the union is
always subject to the duty of fair representation. I think that unions
are going to be very sensitive to the desires of their AfricanAmerican and female members and they're not going to waive any
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such rights without sounding out those important constituencies.
I also believe the Supreme Court's original Alexander v. GardnerDenver decision was influenced by the Court's suspicion that the
unions of the early 1970s might not be quite as vigorous as they
should be in the pursuit of discrimination claims based on race and
gender. I think it is rather anomalous that the courts should let an
isolated individual employee make an agreement with an employer to waive all those statutory rights but deny a union, with
much more equivalent bargaining power, the capacity to do so.
From the Floor: The Railway Labor Act, unlike the National
Labor Relations Act, does not have a religious objector shield for
union security provisions. I have a union shop agreement and a
Seventh Day Adventist who does not pay union dues. The union has
cited him and asked the company to terminate him, and the
company refused to terminate him. The provisions of the union
shop bargaining agreement providing for arbitration say that the
only question before the arbitrator is whether the employee
violated the union shop agreement and if the arbitrator finds that
there is a violation of the union shop agreement, the arbitrator is
to direct the company to dismiss the employee. Ms. Teitelbaum,
what is the loophole in that case, because you're not dealing with
just cause. The employee has counsel, the union has brought the
action before the arbitrator saying the arbitrator is limited to the
interpretation of the union shop agreement
Teitelbaum: If I were on the employee's side, I would look for
things like a clause that said "anything that's in conflict with federal
or state law is void" because that would violate the religious
discrimination provision of Title VII.
From the Floor: But that would be outside the parameters of the
union shop agreement.
Teitelbaum: Correct, but if the union shop agreement as applied
to this situation is unlawful, that portion of the union shop
agreement would be void under any provision that's in conflict
with federal or state law.
St. Antoine: As arbitrator, I apply that union shop clause and
let the parties worry about whether they can get it enforced in
court.
From the Floor: Would you foresee a situation where motion
practice could become very expensive, specifically summary judgment type motions, which essentially could undermine the whole
meaning oflabor arbitration and that the grievant would have a day
in court?
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Vercruysse: That happens time and again in individual arbitration cases. Ifyou do a case before the NASD, for example, involving
an employee who works as a salaried employee and you enter into
motion practice, it saves both parties a considerable expense if
there's no way under the law that the person can proceed. Arbitrators, like judges, are loath to extinguish the right of a plaintiff to
proceed to a full trial. So the case has to be very clear for you to be
successful in that motion practice. Quite frankly, I think motion
practice doesn't undermine arbitration. It reinforces arbitration
because the purpose of arbitration is to resolve disputes and this is
a way of resolving a dispute in a less expensive while still fair
fashion.
From the Floor: Do you think it overlegalizes labor arbitration?
Vercruysse: It wouldn't overlegalize because you've been asked
to apply the law. As an arbitrator of a collective bargaining agreement, you're not asked to apply the law and give legal remedies;
you're asked to reinstate employees, maybe give them back pay.
You usually don't give them punitive damages or attorneys' fees. If
they give you authority to apply the federal or state law, you would
have that authority and so you would be asked to do more legalistic
things. But, be careful of what you ask for, because you may get it.
The point is, if you got new remedial powers, we would start taking
a second look at arbitrators' decisions to see if they misapplied the
law. I'm conflicted there. I don't like to appeal arbitrators' decisions because arbitration, in my mind, is final and binding. I may
threaten to appeal from time to time just to make sure arbitrators
know I can be serious. It's just not what should be done in the
normal course of events. It would take an extraordinary event, in
my mind, to usurp that principle.
From the Floor: My sense is, at least with the individual employment arbitration, the claimant walks in pretty well prepared by the
attorney to understand that this particular procedure is parallel to
that of federal court and indeed they could lose on summary
judgment. I think the union might have quite a burden if indeed
it would agree to such a provision because I think it's going to be
difficult to explain to the grievant that the entire case could be
dismissed totally on the record.
Teitelbaum: I'm not sure that we will all start doing summary
judgment. Usually when you're in court, it's the company trying to
do the summary judgment to keep you from the jury. But I agree
with Bob. We're going to transform these simple quick arbitrations
into complex litigation with expensive discovery. I spend huge
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amounts of time when my plaintiffs' discrimination cases go to
court, with discovery, depositions, etc. It's just going to be a huge
burden and I am going to have to do my arbitration cases differently. Let's be practical: arbitration costs the employee nothing.
The union pays for it. If the union has to arbitrate an employee's
discrimination case as it would be if tried in court, the costs would
be prohibitive.

